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Abstract:  
This paper examines the increasing cross-border flows of 
capital involving developing and emerging economies in the 
past few decades. The discussion challenges the traditional 
economic theories based on net capital flows and deficits in 
current accounts to explain international borrowing by 
developing countries, and on the current account imbalances 
approach to explain financial crises. We argue that the 
increasing involvement of the private sector in developing 
countries’ external debt and the fact that the public sector, 
previously reliant almost entirely on official credit, has become 
able to access private debt markets, reflect the increasing 
integration of developing countries into the global financial 
system, and this process has particular features. A closer look 
at data on gross capital flows reveals that net capital flows 
neither explain nor capture this global financial integration. 
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Different parts of the world engage with each other through trade and payments and 
through cross-border capital flows. The first of these lies within the domain of trade and is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Cross-border capital flows go mostly between Europe and the other Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries whose financial systems are 
steadily being integrated (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Shin, 2009; Truman, 2009; Borio and 
Disyatat, 2011), not only in the sense of rising volumes of cross-border assets and liabilities, 
but also in rising cross-border ownership and operation of banking and financial institutions. 
However, in the past few decades there has been an increase in private non-guaranteed 
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external debt (PNG)1 in developing countries and emerging economies, reflecting the 
increasing cross-border flows of capital as well. 
In the past, the growth of cross-border liabilities was associated with borrowing to finance 
trade deficits. That is, the traditional literature on current account balances, which focuses on 
net capital flows, associates external debt in emerging and developing countries with deficits 
in current accounts, and cross-border capital flows with global current account imbalances. 
However, in a world of huge and free capital flows, the external debt in emerging and 
developing countries is no longer directly associated with deficits in their current accounts. 
Following a phenomenon interchangeably called financial integration or financial 
globalisation, where there is an increasing integration of different domestic financial markets 
within the international ones, resulting in greater mobility of financial assets, these countries 
have experienced a surge in private capital flows since the turn of the century which, together 
with the current account surpluses, have their mirror image in the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves. As a result, cross-border asset positions in these developing countries have 
correspondingly increased, with the share of portfolio liabilities increasing and that of non-
portfolio debt liabilities decreasing. This indicates that the current account position only 
partially explains the patterns of indebtedness of developing countries, and that the growing 
integration into the global financial system increases their exposure to portfolio investment 
that may raise different types of financial stability concerns and expose their economies to 
different factors driving these capital flows. 
This paper presents empirical evidence that during the 2000s emerging economies have 
experienced a surge in private capital flows while presenting current account surpluses. The 
data also show the share of private sector claims increasing and the share of liabilities held by 
government and multilateral institutions decreasing; and how this surge in private capital 
flows within a context of current account surpluses has its mirror image in the accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves. In turn, this connects the capital flows towards these economies 
with factors such as the international monetary cycle.  
We argue that the increasing involvement of the private sector in developing countries’ 
external debt and the fact that the public sector, previously reliant almost entirely on official 
credit, has become able to access private debt markets, reflects the increasing integration of 
developing countries into the global financial system. Further, a closer look at the gross capital 
flows data reveals that net capital flows neither explain nor capture this global financial 
integration. Finally, the paper stresses that an analysis by regions masks the large volume of 
capital and PNG debt flows which mostly concern only a few countries in these developing 
regions.  
 
 
2. Can global imbalances in current accounts explain a country’s cross-border 
financing activity? 
 
The traditional literature on current account balances, which focuses on net capital flows, 
associates external debt in emerging and developing countries with deficits in current 
accounts, and cross-border capital flows with global current account imbalances.  
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The current account balance provides the link between foreign debt sustainability and 
economic development. According to standard neoclassical models, international borrowing 
by developing countries should be regarded positively for two main reasons. Firstly, 
developing countries can finance development with foreign savings. By definition, these 
countries have lower capital stocks and lower saving rates, resulting in higher real interest 
rates and lower investment. Importing capital from richer countries allows lucrative 
investment opportunities to be financed at lower interest rates and provides a mutually 
beneficial arrangement; and a “country’s resources for external debt servicing each period can 
be measured by its trade surplus” (Cooper and Sachs, 1984, p. 5). From a long-term 
perspective, the solvency requirement implies that the discounted value of future trade 
surpluses must be equal to the current foreign debt. A socially optimal borrowing strategy is 
to borrow until the marginal product of capital is equal to the world interest rate. 
The second benefit of international borrowing comes from the intertemporal approach to 
the current account, which sees the balance of payments as determined by forward-looking 
investment and saving decisions (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1994). Intertemporal utility out of 
consumption maximisation gives a result similar to the permanent income theory of 
consumption: consumption is a stable function of permanent national cash-flow, defined as the 
discounted sum of future total output minus investment and government expenditure (Sachs, 
1982; Ghosh and Ostry, 1995). Current accounts are therefore used as a buffer against 
temporary shocks in national cash flows. Within this framework, a temporary negative shock 
in national output will not affect the country’s permanent cash flow, thus leaving current 
consumption unchanged. As a result, the country borrows to smooth consumption, due, for 
example, to a permanent productivity shock, thus running a current account deficit.  
In either case, the current account imbalances and the resulting accumulation of foreign 
debt need not be a cause of concern, as developing countries only borrow from abroad to either 
finance investment by exploiting the lower cost of foreign capital or to try to smooth 
consumption in anticipation of higher future incomes. The corresponding policy view, known 
as the Lawson doctrine,2 maintained that, so long as current account deficits originated in the 
private sector, the resulting liabilities were hedged in the private sector and therefore not a 
cause for policy intervention. 
Empirically, however, the balance of payment and currency crises that hit emerging and 
developing countries in the early 1980s and then again in the late 1990s challenged this 
consensus. Authors began to question the relevance of the intertemporal approach to the 
current account and the associated Lawson doctrine, and consequently current account deficits 
came under closer scrutiny.3 A historical evidence of current account deficits and their 
association with crisis were shown through the works of Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) and 
Edwards (2001), for instance. Current accounts were deemed sustainable if they were 
consistent with the solvency requirement, i.e., if they implied a long-run stable ratio of external 
liabilities to GDP (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998; Reisen, 1998; Edwards, 2001). Further, the 
existence of deficits and their reversal as a result of a sudden stop in net capital flows were 
theorised as the canonical crisis mechanics (Calvo, 1998). 
The discussion on current account deficits, or lack thereof, remained a central research 
topic in the 2000s. The “capital flow puzzle” literature, for example, highlights the fact that, in 
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net terms, capital flows uphill from developing countries to advanced countries (Kose et al., 
2003a; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2007; Prasad et al., 2007). Obstfeld (2012a) argues for a policy 
of monitoring current accounts, as credit booms show a relationship between current account 
imbalances and financial crises. Kose et al. (2003b) document that financial openness, which 
was supposed to allow countries to fully exploit the consumption-smoothing function of 
current accounts, seems to be positively associated with higher consumption volatility, 
especially in lower-income countries. Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) closely relate the 
development of global current account imbalances to the build-up and evolution of the global 
financial crisis, and suggest that their further reduction is a necessary condition of the post-
crisis economic recovery.  
While sometimes maintaining opposite opinions on the importance of current accounts 
for financial and economic stability, the standard critiques of neoclassical models of 
international borrowing by developing countries summarised above seem to share a common 
belief: the current account is the key driver of changes in foreign debt and foreign liabilities in 
general. The focus therefore should be on net external liabilities, just as the current account 
focuses on net capital flows. This view has, however, been challenged by both empirical 
evidence and theoretical arguments linked to the trends of financial globalisation. 
The path-breaking work of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and subsequent related works 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003; 2007; 2008) document that the expansion of cross-border 
asset holdings since 1996, and in the 1990s in particular, has been unprecedented and, while 
it occurred mostly between advanced countries, emerging and developing economies have also 
experienced an increasing degree of financial integration. This trend has given rise to a series 
of empirical regularities. Firstly, in general, gross cross-border holdings and financial flows are 
several orders of magnitude larger than their corresponding net figures (Brunnermeier et al., 
2012; Obstfeld, 2012b). Secondly, the accumulation of foreign assets has increased the 
importance of capital gains and losses on international investment positions (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2007).4 Thirdly, emerging and developing countries have accumulated more 
diversified liabilities – with more private debt and equity-like liabilities as opposed to the past 
concentration on public debt liabilities – as well as accumulating external assets, primarily in 
the form of foreign exchange reserves by central banks. Overall, their net foreign asset position 
seems to have improved in the decade preceding the global financial crisis (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2007). 
Alongside these empirical observations, ‘new’ theoretical arguments were proposed in 
favour of focusing on gross rather than net flows and positions (Johnson, 2009; Borio and 
Disyatat, 2011; Broner et al., 2011; Bruno and Shin, 2013). Borio and Disyatat (2011) argue 
that current accounts, by definition, measure only the transactions that relate to trade in goods 
and services and income transfers, while all other asset transactions are excluded. In their 
view, this arises out of confusion between savings – unspent income – and financing – a cash 
flow concept. Investment, like most economic activities, does not require savings but rather 
financing, which can be found domestically or internationally. In the latter case, it generates a 
cross-border money flow as a result of which an institution in the lending country will have a 
claim (a loan asset) on the borrower and the borrower will have a claim on the lender (a bank 
account credit, which can be transferred to other agents). As a result, current accounts are not 
                                                                                 
4 Such ‘valuation effects’ have been the subject of a vast literature seeking to analyse their role as an 
alternative balance of payment adjustment mechanism. See, for example, Gourinchas and Rey (2005), 
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C. Alves, J. Toporowski 7 
PSL Quarterly Review 
necessarily tied to any specific gross flows or specific domestic activities. Therefore, it is wrong 
to assume that it is ‘necessary’ to have a current account surplus for reserves accumulation or 
a current account deficit to finance investment internationally.  
Saving-investment balances, current accounts and net capital flows analysis reflect only a 
small part of the global financial flows. Very often, gross flow needs bear no relationship to the 
net flows in the current account balance and are generally much larger than the latter, 
reflecting in part the myriad of ways in which expenditures are ultimately financed. In this 
sense, based on the inter-temporal equilibrium approach to current accounts as formalised in 
the 1990s by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), the current account framework analysis of the origin 
and direction of financing, with surplus countries lending to deficit ones, relies on identities 
that track resource flows but are silent about their underlying financing (Borio and Disyatat, 
2015, pp. 4-5). 
Furthermore, the current account balance of payment framework places the foreign 
exchange reserves as a subcomponent of gross outflows and current account surplus is 
frequently tied to accumulation of foreign reserves. However, in general, this is an arbitrary 
match, as gross flows typically exceed net flows and the accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves is generally a purely financial transaction. The accumulation of foreign reserves is the 
result of countless domestic players acquiring foreign assets at any given point in time for 
different reasons5 and, empirically, countries running current account deficits do accumulate 
large amounts of foreign reserves (Borio and Disyatat, 2011, pp. 9-12). 
Finally, Borio and Disyatat (2011; 2015) note that, when assessing capital flows, and more 
specifically global financing patterns, it may be necessary to move away from the residency 
principle, which underlies the balance of payments statistics, to a perspective that consolidates 
operations of individual firms across borders.  
These arguments inspired new theoretical and empirical research into the dynamics and 
consequences of gross capital flows. For example, both gross inflows and outflows typically 
move pro-cyclically, and crises tend to involve sharp reductions in both (Broner et al., 2011). 
Sudden stops of gross flows, whether or not resulting in net sudden stops, may be very 
damaging to the economy (Cavallo et al., 2013). Financial vulnerabilities are largely related to 
gross capital flows and the salient trends in international banking activity, which, in turn, are 
largely unrelated to – or, at the least, not captured by – global current account imbalances 
(Borio and Disyatat, 2011). 
The analytical emphasis on gross flows and cross-border holdings, along with the stylised 
facts of financial globalisation, suggest a different line of inquiry into developing and emerging 
countries’ external financing needs. Alongside traditional indicators, such as current accounts 
and trade balances, the evolution of developing and emerging countries’ external debts should 
be analysed in relation to their integration in the global financial system and changes in the 
maturity structure of that debt, reflecting refinancing and hedging requirements independent 
of any current trade imbalance. Consequently, any assessment of the vulnerability of such 
external positions must take into account the characteristics of such integration, which may 
raise issues other than the common balance of payments vulnerabilities.  
 
                                                                                 
5 The empirical evidence shows that the accumulation of foreign reserves is undeniable and 
unprecedented in emerging markets. Nevertheless, the debate over the reasons and drivers behind this 
accumulation is still controversial and can be variously explained. See Bussière and Mulder (1999); 
Nowak et al. (2004); Rodrik (2006); Reinhart and Reinhart (2008); Painceira (2009). 
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3. External debt – developing countries’ overall picture 
 
3.1. Trends in external debt 
 
The data below show the external debt stocks of developing countries growing steadily 
since the 1970s. After the year 2000, the rate of growth increases and debt is accumulated at a 
much faster rate and is largely long term6 (figure 1). One important feature of this growth is 
the sharp increase in the external debt stock of PNG debt after 2002 (figure 2). This reveals an 
interesting trend. While, during the 1970s and 1980s, external debt accumulation was mainly 
through the public sector, in the early 1990s the private sector gradually began to borrow, and 
since the mid-2000s, has done so at a rapid pace. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Maturity of external debt stocks (current US$ billions) – all developing countries  
 
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 
6 Long-term private and public debt has an original or extended maturity of more than one year, is owed 
to non-residents by residents of an economy, and is repayable in currency, goods, or services (IDS, 2019). 
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Figure 2 – Total external debt stocks – PNG and PPG – all developing countries (current US$ 
billions) 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS). 
 
 
This tendency is confirmed when exploring the different regional dynamics (figure 3). 
Historically, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) used to have the largest external debt 
stocks. Nevertheless, this has been rivalled in the past decade by the rise in external debt in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and East Asia and the Pacific (EAP). Sharp increases in 
external debt stocks are also noted for South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) regions 
from 2006 onwards.7 
Contrary to what might have been expected, the external debt accumulation in all regions 
has continued apace post-2008, with the three largest debtor regions presenting external debts 
in excess of US$1 trillion. The different regional dynamics can also be explored when 
                                                                                 
7 LAC: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela, RB, American and Caribbean. ECA: Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, FYR, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. EAP: Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, 
Vietnam. SA: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. SSA: Angola 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, The Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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considering, in absolute terms, the maturity of external debt. All regions but EAP present a 
majority of long-term external debt. LAC, ECA and EAP have the largest long-term external debt 
stocks, all of which have grown rapidly within the last decade. SA and SSA have also seen fast 
accumulation of long-term debt since 2006, albeit their totals are significantly lower. The 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region’s long-term external debt has remained roughly 
constant (figure A1 in the appendix). 
SA, SSA and MENA have a very small stock of short-term debt, which, especially in the case 
of SSA and MENA, may be explained by the fact that historically the main component of the 
external debt has been official bilateral and multilateral debt. LAC, ECA and EAP have been 
accumulating short-term debt at a faster pace since 2007, in particular the EAP region whose 
fast pace began after 2000 and has become even faster since 2008 (figure A2 in the appendix). 
The EAP particular case may be related to international investors looking to place their money 
elsewhere in the midst of the global financial crisis. However, as the increase has been 
sustained since 1990, despite the steep drop during the crisis in 1997-1998, it is reasonable to 
assume that the short-term debts are associated with trade credits as well. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Total external debt stocks by region (current US$ billions) 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS). 
 
 
In terms of external debt components when considering each of the six regions, the general 
tendency, that is, the sharp increase of the external debt stock of PNG debt after 2002, is 
confirmed, apart from in MENA where PNG debt is close to zero and the bulk of the external 
debt is bilateral debt, with an increasing multilateral component. 
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Historically, particularly in ECA, the majority of the external debt used to be (as it was for 
the other regions) owned by the public sector and, until 1996, external borrowing by the 
private sector was negligible. However, from 1996 onwards, PNG debt began to rise and since 
2004 the private sector’s external borrowing has surpassed that of the public sector, to the 
extent that it was almost double in 2012. The public sector’s external debt was also historically 
dominant in EAP, but PNG debt started to grow rapidly in 2002 and by 2012 had surpassed the 
public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt.  
LAC and SA have both experienced a sharp increase in private sector borrowing, although 
the public sector still owns the majority of the external debt. In LAC, the faster pace of the 
private sector borrowing started in 2005 and has become much more rapid since 2009. In SA, 
the private sector borrowed little internationally up to 2000. However, since 2005, there has 
been a sharp increase in private sector borrowing, and, unlike the other regions, an almost 
similar increase in the public sector’s external borrowing.  
In SSA, external borrowing of the private sector had been negligible until 1995, probably 
because the ability of the private sector to borrow in the capital market was close to zero. 
However, a small increase was noted in 1995 and a recent steeper increase has been visible 
since 2006. In this region, historically, the largest component of the external debt has been 
official bilateral and multilateral debts, although they have slightly decreased in importance.  
Figure 4 depicts a summary of these main tendencies in each region.8 
 
 
Figure 4 – External debt composition by region (current US$ billions) 
 
 
Source: World Bank’s International Debt Statistics (IDS). 
                                                                                 
8 For a detailed analysis of the external debt components in each region since the 1970s, including official 
multilateral and bilateral creditors, see Bonizzi et al. (2015a, pp. 11-26). 
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3.2. Trends in debt sustainability9 
 
Surprisingly, debt indicators such as the interest payment on external debt as a percentage 
of export of goods, services and primary income, and interest payment on external debt as a 
percentage of GNI have, in the aggregate, improved (figure 5). This recent history of external 
debt characterised by a generalised improvement in sustainability has been closely related to 
debt relief programmes, such as the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiatives and the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) (IMF, 2018), which have played their part in 
improving debt servicing capabilities of developing countries; it should be noted, however, this 
is more noticeable on an aggregate level. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Selected debt service indicators – all developing countries 
 
 
 
 
When considering debt indicators to assess the liquidity of borrowers under the HIPC 
initiative and Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF), the total debt service to export, service 
and primary income ratio, defined by HIPC as being sustainable at 15-20%, has been below 
20% since 2006 for all regions except for ECA (figure A3). The DSF states that debt service on 
external debt that is, the ability of the government to repay external debt from domestic 
resources (the budget service ratio) should not be more than 25% of the domestic budget 
revenue and, since 2007, this has shown a downwards tendency for all regions except 
                                                                                 
9 There are no internationally accepted benchmarks for assessing debt sustainability; over time different 
methodologies for criteria and thresholds have been used such as the enhanced Highly-Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative or the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF). Although the criteria of the 
internal financial institutions (IFIs) are not without problems, this paper utilises the benchmarks of the 
HIPC initiative and the DSF to compare debt indicators across regions. 
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Emerging and Developing Europe10 where the indicator has skyrocketed. On the antipodes, the 
MENA region has, since 2004, been consistently below threshold. Overall, after 2012, only 
MENA, LAC and SSA have managed to stay below the threshold (figure A4). Therefore, while 
growth increased, payments (as a share of income) decreased, and the traditional methods of 
sustainability assessment paint a positive picture of the situation.  
In sum, it is fair to conclude that under the HIPC and DSF benchmarks, with the exception 
of ECA, the regions have been quite sustainable, especially after 2004. Accumulation of arrears 
varies hugely and is likely to be driven by a handful of countries in each case that have come 
up against repayment problems.  
 
 
3.3. Concentration of debt 
 
Although the scenario depicted does identify various trends in the external PNG debt of 
developing countries, the diversity cannot be overstated. The ECA and EAP regions, where PNG 
has surpassed PPG debt, comprise six of the ten countries that (of the 124 countries that report 
to the World Bank’s IDS) together account for 65% of the total developing country external 
debt. ECA, with 22 countries, has Turkey, Hungary, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. EAP, with 17 
countries, has China and Indonesia. LAC, where PNG debt is close to surpassing PPG debt, has 
Brazil and Mexico. Furthermore, ECA has five of the top ten countries,11 concentrating large 
sums of PNG debt in absolute terms. LAC has two, EAP two and SA has one.  
This shows that the overall tendency in all developing countries, and in the analysis by 
regions, may be masked by the large volume of debt flows of only a few countries and is very 
likely to be driven by a handful of these developing countries. Figure 6 shows that the 
accumulation of PNG debt is concentrated in a few destinations when comparing, in absolute 
terms, the total external stock of PNG debt of all developing countries against the total external 
stock of PNG debt accumulated in the top ten countries. These ten countries are responsible 
for the bulk of cross-border external private debt.  
Here, it must also be considered that the accumulation of PNG debt is a crucial determinant 
of a country or region’s financial stability. A country or region that is more dependent on PNG 
debt indicates that, on one hand, it has access to international financial markets and is an 
investment destination for institutional investors whilst, on the other, based on lessons from 
the past (see Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009), it indicates the potential instability of these 
flows that have characterised the legacy of financial globalisation. The fluctuations in flow of 
PNG debt are significant and could potentially indicate problems in future financing needs, as 
these changes are frequently unpredictable. In this light, the global cross-border debt in 
developing countries is, in fact, a remarkable concentration of debt and risk in these top ten 
countries.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 
10 Starting with the April 2014 World Economic Outlook Database, the Central and Eastern Europe and 
Emerging Europe regions were renamed Emerging and Developing Europe. 
11 Brazil, India, China, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Mexico, Ukraine, Romania and South Africa. 
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Figure 6 – Total external debt stock of PNG versus total external stock of PNG in the top ten 
countries (current US$ billions) 
 
 
 
 
4. Foreign trade trends in developing countries 
 
Considering the traditional view on the relationship between current accounts and trade 
balances and the evolution of developing and emerging countries’ external debts, it is 
commonly argued that external indebtedness depends, among other things, on current account 
imbalances. Essentially, from a national accounting point of view, current account deficits 
imply a need for foreign resources to finance them.12 In this section, we show that current 
account trade and trade balances do not always follow a close relationship, contrary to the 
traditional view. Furthermore, we show that developing economies in general have 
experienced recurrent surpluses, despite an overall current account balance deterioration 
since 2008. 
The overall picture for emerging and developing countries shows the current account and 
the trade account following a very similar pattern, especially in the 2002-2009 period, when 
they increased remarkably, peaking in 2007 and then contracting in 2008. However, after 2009 
the two series seem to decouple, with the trade balance remaining stable in absolute terms and 
declining slightly as a percentage of GDP, whereas the current account deteriorated sharply 
both in absolute and relative terms, becoming negative in 2013 (figures A5 and A6). The 
declining income balance matches our findings in the previous sections, with debt service 
amounts owed by developing countries increasing steeply during the same time period.  
                                                                                 
12 Statistics come from a wide range of sources. Data for current accounts and their components come 
from UNCTAD for the aggregate figures and income groups, and from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU) for the regional statistics. Data from the United Nations Comtrade Database (UN Comtrade) 
provide a more detailed look at the evolution of trade of developing countries, allowing disaggregation 
across the different components of trade as well as trading partners. The Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC classification) is used to distinguish different types of goods. 
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Overall, figures A5 and A6 show the emerging and developing countries had a current 
account surplus in 2000-2013, but the vast balance of payments surpluses have deteriorated 
since 2007 due to the financial crisis. It is also clear that the position of emerging and 
developing economies seems to be heavily dependent on the global business cycle, which 
mostly influences their current accounts through changes in trade.  
The trade breakdown into commodities shows that, on the one hand, manufacturing is the 
most important part of emerging and developing countries’ exports and imports, accounting 
for roughly twice the value of commodities trade over the whole period. On the other hand, 
while trade in manufacturing presents a roughly balanced account, the overall trade surplus 
has mostly been driven by a surplus in commodities trade (figures A7 and A8). A puzzling 
finding since 2013 is the fact that the commodity trade balance dropped sharply and the 
manufacturing surplus increased equally sharply, leaving the trade balance almost unchanged. 
The data show how this is the result of a decline in commodity exports and manufacturing 
imports, while manufacturing exports continued to increase.  
Net factor income is negative for all regions (except temporarily in the MENA region in a 
few periods), with values around 3% for LA, ASEAN and SSA countries. This is noteworthy since 
it shows that dividend and interest payments to foreign investors and official lenders are a very 
important component of these countries’ financial position and are not balanced by emigrant 
workers’ remittances. The global financial crisis, unlike the trade figures, does not seem to have 
had a clear effect on income flows (figure A9). Current transfers are unsurprisingly positive for 
all regions except the MENA countries. This latter finding most likely reflects the inclusion of 
richer oil-exporting countries in the group, such as the Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar, which are 
not targets of aid and official assistance flows (figure A10). 
In sum, the evolution of emerging and developing countries’ current accounts, which quite 
closely follow that of the trade in goods accounts, presented positive figures until 2008, with 
the exception of SA, whose services trade surplus did not compensate for the growing trade in 
goods deficits. Most countries experienced positive or balanced current accounts, which were 
primarily driven by the positive evolution of their (goods) trade accounts. This again confirms 
that emerging and developing economies seems to be very dependent on the global business 
cycle influencing their current accounts through changes in trade.  
Despite all the regions having suffered as a result of the 2008 crisis, the deterioration of 
trade and current accounts since then has been slow but steady. Although since 2007-2008, 
LA, SSA and SA have not presented surpluses in their current accounts, overall, the figures 
show that most regions have also not been especially vulnerable externally in terms of their 
overall current account balances. That is, the analysis of current accounts suggests that the 
developing world, from the period starting roughly at the turn of the century until the global 
financial crisis, experienced a decade of relatively low ‘traditional’ external vulnerability. 
Finally, the net factor income and current transfers essentially confirm a structural condition 
of emerging and developing countries: they are net interest and dividend payers to foreign 
countries and net receivers of foreign transfers.  
One final important point to highlight is that all regions except SA are net commodity 
exporters, with commodities constituting a growing majority of their exports. Although a more 
detailed study is necessary to examine the proportion of commodity exports to total exports, 
there seems to be a correlation between the share of commodity exports and the trade balance. 
As a consequence, the deterioration of the trade balance caused by the deterioration of 
commodity trade since 2007-2008, which resulted in current account deficits in five of the six 
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regions, can be explained at least partly by the cycle in commodity prices. As shown in figure 
A11, commodity prices which had been low or falling in the 2004-2008 period recovered in 
2009-2012 but have been declining since then. The recent deterioration in current accounts is 
therefore at least partially imputable to a decline in commodity prices.  
 
 
5. International financial integration, current account and external indebtedness 
 
Financial integration of developing countries may not be immediately obvious through the 
examination of current account balances. There are other tendencies that should be examined, 
which can be grouped under a discussion of financial globalisation. The discussion in this 
section and the next one will essentially be putting forward the argument that the idea of 
financial globalisation is in fact at odds with the traditional literature on international 
borrowing. 
The previous discussion shows that, since 2006, not only has the total external debt stock 
increased in emerging and developing countries but the importance of private sector external 
debt has grown. It has also been shown that, outside of the OECD, current accounts are mostly 
driven by trade in goods, except in SA. Thus, the deterioration of commodity trade due to the 
2007-8 financial crisis affected the trade balance, which, in turn, had a negative effect on the 
current accounts. This deterioration is closely related to the commodity price cycle, which was 
low or falling in the 2004-2008 period, recovered in 2009-2012, and has been declining since 
then. This clearly raises possible new concerns about the balance of payments fragility of these 
countries, with commodity dependence being therefore a crucial concern for debt 
sustainability in emerging and developing countries.  
However, despite the deterioration of the trade balances since 2007-2008 and, therefore, 
current account deficits for the majority of the regions in the same period, the accumulation of 
external debt for all emerging developing countries has not directly followed the movements 
in the current accounts. The total external debt stocks in billions of US dollars increased for all 
regions since the beginning of the 2000s, with a sharp increase since 2007-2008. More 
precisely, the accumulation of PNG debt has been increasing since the beginning of the 2000s, 
again with a sharp increase since 2007-2008. In this light, as argued by Borio and Disyatat 
(2011) for the case of the advanced economies, current account positions only partially explain 
the patterns of external indebtedness of emerging and developing countries too. 
It is also important to emphasise that, surprisingly, although debt service has increased 
since the beginning of the 2000s, especially for PNG debt, debt indicators such as interest 
payments on external debt as a percentage of export of goods, services and primary income, 
and interest payments on external debt as a percentage of GNI, have, on aggregate levels, 
improved since the beginning of the 2000s. Furthermore, when considering debt indicators to 
assess the liquidity and solvency of the borrowers under the HIPC and DSF frameworks, it is 
fair to conclude that, apart from ECA, debt in these regions appears to have been quite 
sustainable, especially after 2004. 
Thus, the combination of the evidence presented in the previous sections suggests that the 
characteristics of external debt accumulation in developing countries may not be made 
immediately coherent by the examination of the balance of payment positions. Not only have 
most countries experienced positive or balanced current accounts while experiencing an 
increase in the accumulation of external debt but, as noted above, the debt indicator to assess 
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liquidity and solvency of borrowers also suggests that, in the period starting roughly at the turn 
of the century until the global financial crisis, these emerging and developing countries have 
experienced a decade of relatively low ‘traditional’ external vulnerability. 
An approach to the increase of private financial flows from a different angle, however, 
indicates that the ability of the private sectors in developing countries to borrow abroad has 
increased substantially and the proportion of external liabilities taken up by securitised debts 
has also increased. In this sense, as documented by Akyüz (2012), in many emerging economies 
foreign investors have become primary holders of capital and debt securities as a result of the 
increasing portfolio flows targeting equities and local currency debt. This is also a result of the 
rise in corporations in emerging countries borrowing externally.  
Clear evidence of such an increase in participation by foreign financial investors can be 
seen in the Emerging Portfolio Fund Research (EPFR) database, which collects data from 
mutual funds and shows how foreign investors’ holdings of emerging markets equities and 
bonds have increased rapidly over the past decade (figure 7). This confirms the findings shown 
in figure 2 which indicates a growing composition of external debt made up of private sector 
and public sector bonds. Equity holdings started increasing around 2004 but since 2009 bonds 
holdings have been catching up very quickly, especially after 2008 (figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 7 – EPRF bond allocation (USD millions) 
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Figure 8 – EPFR equity allocation (USD millions) 
 
 
 
 
These figures show an increasing involvement of the private sector in the developing 
countries’ external debt, with the public sector, previously reliant almost entirely on official 
credit, becoming able to access private debt markets. This trend is the product of the 
integration of many developing countries into the global financial system which followed the 
writing down or refinancing of public external debt in those countries through support from 
the International Monetary Fund and the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative.  
More recently, international financial investors, subject to the low-interest-rate 
environment in Japan, North America and Europe, have been attracted by the apparently 
substantially improved fundamentals of many developing countries, in a “search for yield” for 
their portfolio investments.13 Thus, overall, the recent changes in the composition of the 
developing countries’ external debt indicate an increasing involvement of private sector 
institutions, both as borrowers and lenders. This leads us to consider the role that interest 
rates play in this scenario, as interest rates on private external debt are determined in global 
markets, and frequently there is a considerable gap between the international interest rate and 
the (domestic) developing countries’ rates.  
 
                                                                                 
13 It is important to note as well that official development policy has itself become more supportive of 
the private sector. As documented in Bonizzi et al. (2015b), there has been a shift in the official 
development policy consensus towards the promotion of the private sector. Indeed, a substantial part of 
official flows from advanced countries goes to support private sector initiatives, including the financial 
sector, rather than humanitarian purposes. Furthermore, official flows themselves are increasingly 
being augmented with private funds through the process of ‘blending’, whereby private financial 
institutions complement the official aid budgets with guarantees being provided by the borrowers 
and/or the donors. This policy consensus helps explain the expansion of the private sector in some of 
these regions, SSA for example. 
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5.1. Financial globalisation and the international monetary cycle 
 
The capability of developing countries to incur private and public sector external 
indebtedness as well as their potential for refinancing the debt along the yield curve do not 
rest only on their domestic macroeconomic policies. The growing participation of these 
emerging and developing countries in the global financial market increases the susceptibility 
of these countries to the international monetary cycle that determines the liquidity of 
international capital markets. This cycle is driven by the monetary policy of central banks in 
countries that are international financial centres or intermediaries, principally the USA but also 
the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the European Monetary Union and, to some extent, Tokyo 
and Singapore.  
The monetary cycle determines the liquidity of capital markets in these financial centres 
in two ways. Changes in central bank interest rates alter the composition of financing in these 
centres because the relative cost of different types of financing is changed; also, open market 
operations, such as the recent quantitative easing, which is the exchange central banks’ 
reserves for long-term securities, make markets for those securities more liquid.  
There is considerable evidence of a major shift in perceptions of risk in international 
capital markets driven by expected changes in US monetary policy (Rey, 2013; Shin, 2012). 
Whenever US monetary policy becomes highly expansionary, with low interest rates and ample 
provision of liquidity, investors and lenders become more risk-seeking, reducing global 
riskpremia and spreads. Conversely, any prospect of monetary tightening tends to increase 
riskpremia, as investors become more risk-averse and invest in safer assets. With their 
emerging integration into global financial markets, the emerging and developing countries’ 
bond yields may be affected by these processes.14 
The integration of the emerging and developing economies from the perspective of 
increasing cross-border assets and liabilities and, consequently, the increasing presence of 
private international investors should encourage their governments and multilateral agencies 
to look beyond the traditional forms of integration and instability and fluctuation crisis-
mechanisms. The international monetary cycle is one aspect of it, which involves not only US 
monetary policy, including strengthening of the US dollar, so-called quantitative easing and so 
on, but also Bank of England and European Central Bank monetary policies, for example.  
Further, interest rates on private external debt are determined in global markets, which 
clearly applies to bond markets in general. This indicates that private debt is more directly 
exposed to fluctuations in global market changes, so attention has to be given to debts that float 
with market rates, such as LIBOR for example. Capital controls also affect the direction of flows 
in the international capital market, both when they seek to exclude such flows and when such 
flows are allowed.15 
                                                                                 
14 Another frequently used indicator of investors’ confidence is the Volatility-Index (VIX), which 
measures the implied volatility that investors expect from the S&P 500 Index. Higher levels imply high 
expected volatility and therefore a low risk appetite on the part of investors. Spikes in the VIX can be 
seen in May 2010, August 2011 and August 2015, all notoriously turbulent periods for financial markets. 
Comparing this with the previous evidence, it can be seen that, during these periods, inflows were much 
lower (May 2010) or negative (August 2011). Taking SSA as an example again, it can also be seen that 
spreads soared in the second half of 2015. 
15 An analysis of the capital flows among emerging and developing economies considering some of these 
aspects is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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In sum, financial integration and the increased presence of private investors and private 
capital in emerging and developing countries make the latter’s financing conditions more 
closely dependent on global financial market trends. This in turn reveals two interesting 
aspects. First, it confirms the limitations of the current account framework in explaining capital 
inflows and outflows to these countries. Second, while the access of these countries to more 
diverse sources of credit can be potentially positive for external debt sustainability, it also adds 
the vulnerability of global financial factors to the traditional balance of payments concern. 
Therefore, the integration of these markets into the global financial system needs careful 
scrutiny to ensure that it does not create more instability than benefits.  
 
 
6. Further analysis of financial globalisation 
 
In light of the previous discussion, it is relevant to question the traditional literature on 
international borrowing and to highlight a few aspects that underline the current financial 
integration of developing countries, such as the accumulation of foreign reserves. To this aim, 
figure 9 looks at current account balances, private financial flows (net), official flows (net), and 
changes in foreign reserves. Unsurprisingly, it can be seen that, since the turn of the century, 
there has been a substantial increase in net private inflows to emerging and developing 
economies – from around 100 to over 500 USD billions between 2002 and 2007. In line with 
the findings of the previous sections, this was accompanied by surpluses in the current 
accounts, which resulted in the explosion of reserves accumulation, which increased more than 
ten-fold in the same period. While the global financial crisis has absorbed some of these 
increases, the levels of these positions remain much higher than in 2006.  
Because of the domestic arrangements underpinning the financial integration in emerging 
economies (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; 2005; Eichengreen et al., 2002), the need to 
accumulate foreign reserves has been adopted by these economies as a policy of self-insurance 
since the financial crises of the 1990s (Datz, 2008, p. 84; Lapavitsas, 2009, p. 14; Painceira, 
2009, p. 12).16 Put simply, in the absence of a structural change of global finance since the crises 
of the late 1990s, foreign reserves were used as a defence against sudden reversals of capital 
flows (Painceira, 2009, p. 12), particularly after short-term borrowing began to rise again 
(Lapavitsas, 2009, p. 14). 
Interestingly, bearing in mind the debate over the unholy trinity and the constraint issue, 
the mainstream economic literature makes a similar argument. It is argued that the financial 
crises in the late 1990s, marked by sudden reversals of capital flows, resulted in the emerging 
economies using global liquidity as an opportunity to increase their foreign exchange reserves 
in order to cope with exchange rate depreciation due to capital flight; this accumulation gave 
them more flexibility and control over their monetary policies (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008, 
p. 22).17 
                                                                                 
16 Although the accumulation of foreign reserves has also been associated with regular current account 
surpluses in emerging economies, empirical evidence shows that the self-insurance policy has been 
applied by countries with no current account surpluses but with significant short-term capital flows, 
notably in Africa (Alves et al., 2016). 
17 The mainstream debate has also focused on ascertaining the optimal level of international reserves 
(Bussière and Mulder, 1999; Nowak et al., 2004) and the measurement of the social cost of reserve 
accumulation (Rodrik, 2006). 
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Although the causes of foreign exchange reserves accumulation can be variously 
explained, it nevertheless signals, along with high net private capital inflows, the growing 
presence of emerging and developing countries in the global financial system. Thus, emerging 
markets have been major recipients of private financial flows albeit most of these flows have 
been ‘recycled’ back by the central banks to advanced countries in the form of foreign exchange 
reserves. 
 
 
Figure 9 – Emerging and developing economies international flows (USD billions) 
 
 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook database (several years). 
 
 
Figure A12 shows that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves resulted, as 
expected, in an increasing share of reserves to total external assets. The figure furthermore 
shows how the share of portfolio liabilities to total liabilities and that of debt (portfolio and 
other) liabilities have moved in almost symmetrically opposite directions over the whole 1990-
2010 period. The increase in the portfolio liabilities share is especially remarkable since FDI 
also increased substantially in the same period. The financial crisis since 2008 has tended to 
reduce the pace of these trends, but it has not reversed them. This trend is closely linked to the 
rapid and sustained increase in PNG debts analysed before and seems to indicate an increasing 
importance of capital and bond markets in the dynamics of emerging and developing external 
liabilities. 
It is important to note, however, that, in several periods, reserve accumulation actually 
exceeded the current account surplus. Taking as an example the Emerging Asia countries,18 
figure A13 illustrates the gross capital flows against current account balance and changes in 
                                                                                 
18 Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. 
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reserves, and confirms that the common approach of linking current account surplus to the 
accumulation of official reserves should be taken carefully, especially considering that gross 
flows typically considerably exceed net flows. 
This confirms, as argued by Borio and Disyatat (2011), the inadequacy of the common 
assumption that gross flows are determined by net flows and, by extension, the treatment of 
the current account balance as the main determinant of gross flows. The question that then 
remains is to what extent the changes in foreign exchange reserves, by construction a sub-
component of gross outflows, reflect official-sector holdings of foreign-currency liquid assets, 
and how those reserves are related to gross capital inflows into emerging and developing 
countries. Given the increase of PNG debt in a few developing countries since 2006, this 
question may lead to a definition of foreign assets that is broader than the definition of foreign 
reserves. 
 
 
6.1. Gross and net capital flows and the centralisation of external private debt 
 
The evidence for financial globalisation can also be seen in figures A14 and A15 which 
show the data on cross-border holdings, with external assets and liabilities growing 
continuously since 1970 (and particularly quickly in the 2000s), both in absolute terms and as 
a percentage of GDP. Another notable feature is the progressively narrowing gap between 
assets and liabilities over the same period, indicating improving net foreign asset positions, as 
documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
The significant growth of assets and liabilities not only confirms the idea of financial 
globalisation but indicates that current accounts, i.e., net flows, do not play a dominant role in 
determining gross capital flows, and the definition of foreign reserves as constructed in the 
national account may not cover the bulk of gross inflows that originate in the private sector.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, an important line of inquiry in this context 
is to understand the driving forces behind these cross-border flows, and, by extension, the 
drivers behind the increase in the external debt of the private sector in these developing 
countries in the last few decades. The current account position not only fails to explain the 
cross-border capital flows but also overstates a trend (concentration of cross-border debt) that 
is typical of only a few countries. Participation in financial globalisation is specific to a few 
countries in these developing regions, and their respective gross capital inflow and outflow. 
Analyses of this process should break away from an examination based on regions or income 
groups and focus on these countries (see Bonizzi, 2015). 
It is also clear that an analysis of gross capital flows and current accounts, and of gross 
capital inflows by categories (for example, official, direct investment and government 
securities), as done by Borio and Dysatat (2011) for the US, is long overdue in these ten 
countries that together comprise 65% of the total of developing countries’ private external 
debt. It also seems extremely important when assessing global financing to move away from 
the issues of trade balances to an approach that looks at operations of individual firms across 
borders, which sometimes are largely unrelated or not captured by current account 
imbalances.  
For example, during the period before the 2007-8 crisis, some of the largest exporters in 
Brazil, making use of extremely high domestic interest rates and considerable international 
liquidity, engaged in arbitrage operations using their external resources as the base for 
transactions in the derivative market. The crisis and as a consequence the devaluation of the 
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Real caused large capital losses for these exporters, which in several cases threatened their 
solvency (see Barbosa and de Souza, 2010, p. 24). The government had no choice but to 
intervene, offering/facilitating them credit, especially because these firms were major players 
determining the Brazilian balance of payments. Despite the clear solvency threat, the cross-
border flows between these exporters and non-residents have not been clearly documented, 
especially by the national account statistics.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
External debt accumulation among developing countries increasingly occurred in the 
private sector, starting in the early 1990s and accelerating after the mid-2000s. The significant 
increase in the developing countries’ private external debts and, therefore, the surge in private 
capital flows, happened mainly within a context of current account surpluses. The surpluses in 
the current accounts partially explain the explosion of the foreign reserves accumulation that 
happened at the same time in developing and emerging economies. The explanation is only 
partially due to the fact that not only did this accumulation, in several periods, exceed the 
current account surpluses, but it also carried on, though at a slower pace, even when these 
regions started showing a deterioration in trade balances from 2007-2008 onwards.  
The deterioration of trade balances followed by current account deficits for the majority 
of the regions since 2007-2008 might have reinforced the tendency towards the increase in 
external private sector indebtedness that started in early 1990. Further, the deterioration was 
closely related to the commodity price cycle, which clearly raises possible new concerns about 
the balance of payments fragility of these countries, with commodity dependence being a 
crucial concern for debt sustainability in a traditional sense in emerging and developing 
countries. 
However, the increasing involvement of the private sector in developing countries’ 
external debt means the increasing integration of these countries into the global financial 
system, and this integration is no longer limited to trade in goods and services and to income 
transfers. Financial transactions vastly outpaced trade-related transactions, as the trend of 
financial globalisation involves a bulk of other asset transactions that originate in the private 
sector and are excluded from the traditional current account framework.  
This becomes clearer when examining some of the features of the financial globalisation 
that began in the 1990s in developing and emerging countries when foreign investors became 
primary holders of capital and debt securities as a result of both the increasing portfolio flows 
targeting equities and local currency debt and the rise in emerging countries’ corporations 
external borrowing. The growth of external assets and liabilities raises questions about the 
common approach linking the current account surplus to the accumulation of official reserves. 
Reserve accumulation broadly indicates, along with the high net private capital inflows, the 
growing presence of emerging and developing countries in the global financial system. 
However, it does not explain or justify the drivers behind cross-border capital flows, as the 
volume of gross capital flows dwarfs that of net (current account) flows. Moreover, the 
accumulation shows that emerging markets have not only been major recipients of private 
financial flows but most of these flows have been returned to developed countries in the form 
of foreign exchange reserves. 
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The growing participation of emerging and developing countries in the global financial 
market means that they are exposed to the international monetary cycle that determines the 
liquidity conditions in those markets. Thus, the private and public sector external indebtedness 
as well as its refinancing is directly affected by the monetary policy of central banks in 
developed countries, which in turn results in different types of external vulnerabilities than the 
traditional balance of payment concerns. 
It is also important to highlight that financial globalisation is a process specific to only a 
few countries in these developing regions, and their respective gross capital inflows and 
outflows. The current account position by regions not only fails to explain the cross-border 
capital flows, but it also overstates a trend (concentration of cross-border debt) that is typical 
of only a handful of countries. Scholars and policy-makers assessing the process of financial 
globalisation should focus on what is happening in these countries.  
Overall, although global gross capital flows have largely resulted from flows among 
advanced economies despite a decline in their share of world trade, emerging and developing 
countries have also been part of this global integration, becoming more vulnerable to both 
shifts in commodity prices and dependent on the international monetary cycles and monetary 
policy in developed countries. Therefore, an engagement with developing countries that 
focuses solely on trade and the provision of finance for development ends up neglecting a 
system of cross-border financial assets and liabilities resulting from countless domestic 
players engaging in purely financial transactions at any given point in time for a myriad of 
different reasons, which affects the vulnerability of those countries in a so-far understudied 
way, and through that the vulnerability of the international financial system at large. 
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